Threat intel reportPanorays Threat Center · October 30, 2026

Primary impacted company
Cursor
Incident type
Data Exposure
Current statusContainedSince October 29, 2026. The company, vendor or authorities have cut the attackers’ access or isolated the affected systems. Impact is still being assessed.
  1. IdentifiedOctober 29, 2026First report of the incident2
  2. ActiveNot reportedNo article showed it
  3. ContainedOctober 29, 2026CursorAccess cut, systems isolated12
  4. ConcludedNot yet

What happened

A trojanized version of Anthropic’s official Claude Code extension was distributed through the Cursor Marketplace as a legitimate update, attempting to install a persistent SSH backdoor on affected systems.12

The malicious update, released as version 2.1.313 under Anthropic’s legitimate extension identifier anthropic.claude-code, contained a malicious 66-line loader prepended to the legitimate extension code.12 Upon activation, the extension added an attacker-controlled SSH key labeled “svc-telemetry” to “~/.ssh/authorized_keys”, attempted to establish a reverse SSH tunnel to 134.209.82.225, and configured persistence through scheduled tasks, crontab, or a LaunchAgent. The extension also transmitted host reconnaissance data, including IP addresses, local usernames, hostnames, Git email configurations, and the names of up to 40 sensitive environment variables, over an unencrypted HTTP request to 134.209.82.225:8099/beacon.1

Cursor reported that the incident affected at most 5,000 users who installed the package between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. PT on October 29, 2026.12 Cursor temporarily shut down its marketplace to pull the compromised package, while Anthropic released clean version 2.1.314 to Open VSX and the Microsoft VS Code Marketplace. The unauthorized update was isolated to Cursor’s marketplace, with no evidence that it reached Open VSX or Microsoft’s official VS Code Marketplace.1

Confirmation ladder

3
  1. Attacker claimNot reached

    A threat actor says it did this. No independent confirmation.

  2. Trusted source reportedOctober 30, 2026

    A credible third party reported it: a security vendor, a mainstream outlet, or a government or CERT advisory. The company has not acknowledged it.

  3. Company acknowledgedOctober 29, 2026

    The affected company itself confirmed or acknowledged it, for example in a statement or a regulatory filing.

  4. Follow-upOctober 30, 2026

    Coverage after the company acknowledged it: further statements, arrests, charges, fines or lawsuits. It never raises the verification.

Timeline

3
  1. Between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. PT on October 29, 2026

    At most 5,000 users install compromised Claude Code extension version 2.1.313 through the Cursor Marketplace.12

    What the attackers didCompany acknowledged

  2. October 29, 2026

    Cursor identifies the security incident and temporarily shuts down its extension marketplace to remove the malicious package.12

    What the company didCompany acknowledged

  3. October 30, 2026

    Anthropic publishes clean Claude Code version 2.1.314 to Open VSX and the Microsoft VS Code Marketplace after the malicious package is removed.1

    What the company didFollow-up

Attack analysis

Attack vector
Trojanized extension update via the Cursor Marketplace

Attackers published a modified version of Claude Code (version 2.1.313) using Anthropic’s legitimate extension identifier anthropic.claude-code directly to the Cursor IDE marketplace.12

Attack model
Software supply chain compromise and persistent backdoor deployment

The payload introduced an unauthorized SSH key, established cross-platform persistence, initiated a reverse SSH tunnel, and harvested host reconnaissance data.12

Data exposed
Host reconnaissance details and environment variable names

The extension sent public IP addresses, hostnames, usernames, OS and CPU architectures, Git email addresses, and the names of up to 40 environment variables containing sensitive keywords to a remote server.1

  1. Taken October 30, 20261
  2. Leak threatened
  3. Leaked or for sale
Scale
At most 5,000 users

Cursor confirmed that the incident impacted at most 5,000 users who downloaded the extension during the distribution window on October 29, 2026.1

Dwell time
Approximately 11 hours

The malicious package was distributed between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. PT on October 29, 2026 before being pulled.1

Techniques Attacker behaviour described in the articles, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK

  • Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply ChainATT&CK IDT1195.002TacticInitial AccessMapped fromdistributing a modified extension package through a software marketplace12
  • Software Extensions: IDE ExtensionsATT&CK IDT1176.002TacticPersistenceMapped fromexecuting malicious loader code inside an IDE extension12
  • Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized KeysATT&CK IDT1098.004TacticPersistenceMapped fromadding an attacker-controlled key labeled svc-telemetry to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys1
  • Protocol TunnelingATT&CK IDT1572TacticCommand and ControlMapped fromestablishing a reverse SSH tunnel to a remote C2 address1
  • Scheduled Task/Job: CronATT&CK IDT1053.003TacticPersistenceMapped frominstalling persistence via crontab1
  • Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskATT&CK IDT1053.005TacticPersistenceMapped frominstalling persistence via a scheduled task1
  • Create or Modify System Process: Launch AgentATT&CK IDT1543.001TacticPersistenceMapped frominstalling persistence via LaunchAgent1
  • System Information DiscoveryATT&CK IDT1082TacticDiscoveryMapped fromcollecting OS, CPU architecture, hostname, and working directory details1
  • System Owner/User DiscoveryATT&CK IDT1033TacticDiscoveryMapped fromquerying local username and global Git user email configuration1
  • Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolATT&CK IDT1048.003TacticExfiltrationMapped fromtransmitting beacon data over unencrypted HTTP1

Technologies

  • Cursor
  • Cursor Marketplace
  • Claude Code
  • VS Code
  • Open VSX
  • SSH

Indicators Addresses, domains and files linked to the attackers. Values are defanged and not linked.

  • IP address134.209.82[.]225C2 server for reverse SSH tunneling and beacon endpoint1
  • URL134.209.82[.]225:8099/beaconUnencrypted HTTP beacon URL for telemetry exfiltration1

Blast radius

Attacker
UnattributedSoftware supply chain compromise and persistent backdoor deployment
Way in
Trojanized extension update via the Cursor Marketplace
What the sources say
Attackers published a modified version of Claude Code (version 2.1.313) using Anthropic’s legitimate extension identifier anthropic.claude-code directly to the Cursor IDE marketplace.
Affected products
Cursor, Cursor Marketplace, Claude Code, VS Code, Open VSX, SSH
Sources
12
Who was hit · 2
C
CursorUnauthorised Access Company acknowledgedCursor’s IDE extension marketplace was abused to distribute an unauthorized trojanized extension package to up to 5,000 users.12
A
AnthropicUnauthorised Access Trusted source reportedAnthropic’s official Claude Code extension ID and publisher brand were abused to distribute the trojanized version 2.1.313 update.12

Other companies in the coverage

2
  • M
    MicrosoftMentioned only Informational Mention

    Microsoft’s official VS Code Marketplace was confirmed not to have been reached or impacted by the malicious update.1

  • O
    OVHcloudMentioned only Informational Mention

    OVHcloud was referenced as background context regarding an earlier CLI binary replacement incident.1

TPCRM perspective

Supply chain angle

Risk typeCompromised developer extension registry and downstream workstation backdoors

Dependency

Developer IDE marketplace integration. Development teams rely on Cursor Marketplace to discover, install, and automatically update IDE extensions.1

Party

First party if it is your own company; third party if you use Cursor Marketplace directly; fourth party through a supplier that uses it.

Exposure path

An unauthorized trojanized extension served under a trusted package identity automatically executes upon IDE startup, installing persistent backdoors on developer endpoints without requiring initial repository access.

Assets at risk

Local developer workstation access, SSH keys, private source code, and cloud access tokens stored in environment variables.1

You are exposed if

Engineers or suppliers downloaded or auto-updated the Claude Code extension via Cursor Marketplace on October 29, 2026.1

Mitigations Published by the affected company and the vendor, with the source of each

  1. Isolate affected systems, remove the unauthorized svc-telemetry SSH key from ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, and delete unauthorized scheduled tasks, crontab entries, and LaunchAgents.1

    Source: Cursor · Affected party
  2. Rotate all developer credentials and active sessions, specifically focusing on cloud and CI/CD secrets matching environment variable names.1

    Source: Cursor · Affected party
  3. Update Claude Code to clean version 2.1.314.1

    Source: Anthropic · Vendor

Follow it in Panorays

  • Risk InsightsSearch “Cursor”

    The Supply Chain Impact tab lists your direct and indirect suppliers linked to Cursor.

  • Cyber News and Dark Web MentionsCursor’s company page

    There are 2 articles on Cyber News related to this event.

  • Supply ChainEach company’s page

    Shows whether the company uses Cursor Marketplace.

  • Confirm Cursor extension inspection and secret rotationQuestionnaire / general task · to the companies linked to Cursor

    Ask whether developers running Cursor installed Claude Code version 2.1.313, whether host persistence and injected SSH keys have been audited and removed, and whether sensitive API credentials were fully rotated.

Sources

2
  1. 1
    Official Claude Code VS Code Extension Compromised to Install Persistent SSH BackdoorThe Hacker News · October 30, 2026

    The Hacker News technical analysis detailing the trojanized Claude Code extension distributed via Cursor Marketplace.

  2. 2
    Security notice: malicious version of Anthropic.claude-code (2.1.313) identified in the Cursor Extension MarketplaceCursor · October 29, 2026

    Official security notice from Cursor identifying the malicious package on its marketplace.